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Introduction
This article reports on tests of rational political business cycle (PBC) models using an extensive new data set covering all Portuguese mainland municipalities. With a panel of observations for budget balances and expenditure items over the periods, it is possible to examine the fiscal choices of local governments over a number of electoral cycles. Thus, we can check whether incumbent politicians increase municipal spending in pre-election periods. Although most previous studies of political business cycles have employed macro-level time series data, the examination of municipal government decisions is motivated by rational political business cycles of the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) type. In those models, incumbents increase spending relative to taxes in pre-election periods as a signal of competence in the presence of imperfect information. This signaling motivation should apply to incumbent politicians at local, as well as national levels. Using this data, we can also investigate if expenditure choices are affected by the timing of national elections and if the opportunistic cycle in spending is influenced by the mayor's ideology, the support she enjoys at the municipal assembly, and by her decision to run for another term in office.
Use of data for Portuguese municipalities 1 is motivated by the fact that they constitute a very good laboratory to test for the existence of rational political business cycles. First, data on public expenditures are very detailed, allowing for tests of PBC on particular expenditure categories. Second, the institutional structure of local governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all localities, making this panel preferable to one composed of several countries, or states, with different institutions and policy instruments. Third, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities have elections in the same day. Finally, because the data set is large (with a maximum of 278 cross-sections and 22 years of observations), inferences are likely to be more revealing that those obtained with smaller panels of countries and/or states.
Our empirical results provide clear evidence of opportunistic behaviour by mayors (Presidentes de Câmara), evidenced by pre-election increases in expenditure items highly visible to the electorate, such as investment expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works and rural roads. Econometric tests also demonstrate that the dimension of the opportunistic cycle in expenditures does not depend on 1 Since there are no states or administrative regions in mainland Portugal, the municipalities are the largest governmental entities below the national government.
whether the mayor's party has a majority of deputies in the municipal assembly or on whether the incumbent runs for another term in office. However, the cycle's magnitude seems to be influenced by ideology; namely left-wing oriented mayors tend to behave more opportunistically than right-wing ones.
The article is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on political business cycles. Section 3 presents a short digression on municipalities and describes the dataset. The empirical strategy used to investigate the impact of elections on municipal budgets and expenditures is explained in section 4 and the results obtained are presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions are reported in section 6.
Political business cycles and municipal governments
The theory of political business cycles (PBC) originated with Nordhaus (1975) , who proposed a model in which incumbent politicians would manipulate the economy to gain electoral advantage. The model presumed that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies would produce a pre-election boom, lowering the unemployment rate, and that myopic voters would respond by supporting the incumbent party with a favorable vote.
Given the formulation of the model's expectational Phillips curve, inflationary consequences of the pre-election expansion were largely delayed until after the election, when policy would switch to a more contractionary stance. The Nordhaus model generated much interest and research, but ultimately was a victim of the rational expectations revolution. Nordhaus assumed that voters' expectations were formed adaptatively; i.e., they were based on what voters had recently observed. Pre-election stimulus created "favorable" conditions only because the public failed to anticipate the stimulus and its ultimate consequences. In essence, voters were repeatedly tricked in successive electoral cycles.
In the years following Nordhaus's contribution, the assumption of adaptative expectations has become regarded as untenable in economic theory; the idea that voters would be tricked in the same fashion in repeated elections seems especially improbable.
Instead, the assumption of rational expectations, which rules out systematic expectational errors, has become the norm. However, the political business cycle model did not die, but was rehabilitated in a rational expectations environment. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) developed an explanation for the PBC in which asymmetric information replaced voter myopia in explaining electoral cycles in economic policies. In their model, voters have rational expectations, but are unsure of the "competence" of politicians (here competence refers to an ability to produce public output with fewer inputs; i.e., at lower cost). Their model can produce an equilibrium in which incumbent politicians increase government spending in pre-election periods in an effort to signal competence. The Rogoff-Sibert model was a welcome contribution for researchers with an empirical interest in political business cycles. Although the implications of the model for cycles in outcomes (as opposed to policies) were ambiguous, the possibility existed, and the necessity for the adaptative expectations assumption was obviated.
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Most empirical research on political business cycles has made use of nationallevel data on elections, policies, and economic outcomes. For research based on the Nordhaus model, this was a natural consequence of the development of the theory. The model posited that voters looked at macroeconomic conditions, specifically unemployment and inflation, and that politicians controlled them. Naturally, macroeconomic variables were the object of empirical studies of the PBC as well. With the arrival of the Rogoff-Sibert reconstruction, empirical research did not fundamentally change its direction. The existence of the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) model provided justification for continued interest in the political business cycle, but its major effect was to provide improved theoretical underpinnings rather than to change the way in which political business cycle studies were empirically implemented.
Importantly, the Rogoff-Sibert model is distinguished by the assumption that voters evaluate efficiency in public production. At the local government level, production of public services like fire protection, education, and public safety is a principal activity; it follows that the Rogoff-Sibert model should apply at local governmental levels. It is probably more difficult to argue that voters try to assess "efficiency" in production of national defense, foreign affairs, income redistribution, or legal institutions, which are important concerns of national governments. Thus, the Rogoff-Sibert model is not only applicable to the behavior of local governments; it may be most applicable at that level. In fact, already at the beginning of the 1990's Rogoff highlighted the advantages of research on state or local governments:
"The equilibrium political budget cycle theory suggests that it would be more promising to focus empirical research on testing for electoral cycles in taxes, transfers, and government consumption spending. For these variables, one can also look at data for state and local elections, instead of concentrating solely on the small number of observations available for national elections" (Rogoff, 1990: 33-34) .
In contrast, the Nordhaus model typically would not apply well to municipalities. Local governments have little ability to stimulate employment through expenditures, since much of the employment impact of added spending will be felt outside of the locality.
The impact of local decisions on inflation rates is even smaller.
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One of the first studies that followed Rogoff's suggestion was Blais and Nadeau (1992) , which tested the existence of political fiscal cycles in ten Canadian provinces, from 1951 to 1984. Results suggested the existence of a short electoral cycle, only in the year before the election, and mainly visible on social services and road expenditures.
According to these authors, there are no substantial differences in the magnitude of local governments' opportunistic behaviour that can be attributable to ideology, the duration of terms, or tenure in office.
Using data from local governments in Israel, Rosenberg (1992) There are no differences in budgeting rules and institutions across Portuguese mainland municipalities, 9 however, the law regulating local public finances changed several times during the period considered. 10 Municipalities are financially autonomous. 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001 , always in December.
Model specification
The first empirical model to be implemented uses the budget balance (per capita, at 1995 prices) as the dependent variable. 12 Since mayors have little control over their municipality's revenues, it is possible that expenditures are more subject to political manipulation than budget balances. Thus, a model that has real per capita total expenditures, TotExp, as the dependent variable was estimated. But, since current expenditures are strongly conditioned by salaries, it is likely that the evidence for political business cycles is greater for capital expenditures, CapExp, and, among these, for investment expenditures, InvExp (both expressed in real terms, per capita). Thus, equations for these types of expenditures were also estimated.
The following explanatory variables are used in these four models:
• Lagged values of the dependent variable, in order to account for the autoregressive component of the time series; • TotTransf it is the total of real per capita transfers that the municipality i receives during the year t. Given their weight of roughly 70% in the municipalities' revenues, it is anticipated that transfers have a strong positive effect on total expenditures, TotExp.
• CapTransf it , the real per capita capital transfers that municipality i receives during year t, are used instead of TotTransf it in the equations for capital expenditures (CapExp) and investment expenditures (InvExp). 13 Transfers also reflect, and allow us to control for, the macroeconomic performance of the country. We anticipate that greater transfers allow for greater expenditures; • ElectionYear it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in municipal election years and zero in non-election years. With this variable we test the hypothesis that municipal budget deficits and expenditures are higher in election years. Thus, a negative estimated coefficient is expected for ElectionYear in the equation for the BudgetBalance and positive signs are expected in the equations for TotExp, CapExp and InvExp; 12 For each municipality, the budget balance was divided by the consumer price index for the base year (1995) and, then, by its population. The budget balance, based on public accounting, is calculated according to the methodology of the General Direction of the Budget (Direcção Geral do Orçamento) of the Ministry of Finance, which excludes the transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of revenues and expenditures. 13 Capital transfers account, on average, for 72% of capital expenditures. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 .
• Right it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the mayor (Presidente The empirical model can be summarized as follows:
where y it is the dependent variable and p is its number of lags included in the model, ' it X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, ν i is the individual effect of municipality i, and ε it is the error term.
Given the presence of individual effects, ν i , the model referred to above can be estimated assuming that those effects are either fixed or random. But, the lagged value 14 These population categories are used in the legislation to determine the mayors' salaries. 
The valid instruments are: levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more periods (y i1 ,…,y it-2 ); levels of the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods (x i1 ,…,x it-2 ); levels of the pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods (x i1 ,…,x it-1 ); and the levels of the exogenous variables, current or lagged (x i1 ,…,x it ) or, simply, the first differences of the exogenous variables (∆x it ).
More moment conditions are available if we assume that the explanatory variables (x it ) are uncorrelated with the individual effects (ν i ). In this case, the first lags of these variables (x it-1 ) can be used as instruments in the levels equation. The estimation then combines the set of moment conditions available for the firstdifferenced equations with the additional moment conditions implied for the levels equations.
If the level of an explanatory variable x it is correlated with the individual effects ν i but its first-differences (∆x it ) are not, lagged values of the first-differences (∆x it-1 ) can be used as instruments in the equation in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Lagged differences of the dependent variable (∆y i,t-1 ) may also be valid instruments for the levels equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable and/or the independent variables are persistent.
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15 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2001) . 16 Since there is some persistence of expenditures and transfers, it is appropriate to estimate this system-GMM. Furthermore, difference Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the GMM that only includes the first-differenced equations.
Empirical results
The estimation results of the models described in the previous section using the method system-GMM for linear dynamic panel data models are shown in Table 2 . It presents the two-step results, using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples. The first lag of the dependent variable is always statistically significant, and it was necessary to include a second lag in the investment expenditures equation. 19 As anticipated, the greater the transfers received by a municipality in a given year, the greater are its expenditures: the estimated coefficients associated with TotTransf and
CapTransf have positive signs in the last three equations.
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There is strong evidence of rational opportunistic cycles for the four dependent variables considered in Table 2 , as ElectionYear is always statistically significant and correctly signed. Thus, in municipal election years there are larger budget deficits and higher total, capital and investment expenditures than in the other years of the electoral cycle. As anticipated, the empirical evidence is relatively weak for the budget balance and for total expenditures (for which ElectionYear is only marginally statistically significant) and much greater for capital and investment expenditures. 21 Results indicate 17 Although it is more common to present the one-step results because the two-step standard errors are generally biased downwards, that problem does not apply to our case, since the econometric software PcGive 10.2 uses the finite-sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000) . Thus, we present the twostep results, as these have the advantage of being consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In all models, all available instruments were used. 18 When taking lags and first-differences, the observations for three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) are dropped, leading to a panel of 275 municipalities and 20 years of observations. 19 The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the need to avoid second order autocorrelation of the residuals. Although the second lag of InvExp is not statistically significant, there is second order autocorrelation of the residuals when it is not included. 20 Although transfers are exogenous relative to expenditures, their levels are correlated with the individual effects. Thus, the once lagged first differences of transfers were used as instruments in the equation in levels. 21 A model for current expenditures was also estimated. Results confirmed our hypothesis that they were not subject to opportunistic manipulation, given their greater inertia. Nevertheless, we found evidence that left-wing oriented mayors spend more in current expenditures than right-wing ones. per capita expenditures, but do not exhibit statistically significant differences from the most populous ones regarding budget balances and capital and investment expenditures.
In the estimations whose results are shown in Table 3 , we tested whether the magnitude of the opportunistic cycle in investment expenditures depends on the mayor's ideology, the support she enjoys in the municipal assembly, or on running for another term in office. 24 In column 1, the variable ElectionYear was interacted with dummy variables representing the mayor' ideology: Right and Left (=1-Right). Results suggest that all mayors behave opportunistically, but left-wing oriented ones increase their expenditures in the election year by a higher amount than right-wing ones: the 22 2170 PTE = 10.82 euro. The conversion rate is: 1 euro = 200.482 PTE. 23 The relative changes for the budget balance and total expenditures are of -24% and 2.6%, respectively. Although the increase in the deficit indicates a strong opportunistic effect, this results should be interpreted with caution, as the estimated coefficient is only marginally statistically significant. 24 The five control variables were included in all estimations, but their coefficients and t-statistics are not shown in order to economize space. Furthermore, the objective of this study is to test for the existence of political business cycles, which does not require a detailed analysis of results regarding the control variables.
estimated coefficient associated with ElectionYear*Left is more than twice that of ElectionYear*Right. Rosenberg's (1992) hypothesis that incumbents that do not run for another term in office generate a greater opportunistic cycle than those that do is tested in column 3.
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ElectionYear was interacted with the dummy variables Recand, which equals 1 when the mayor runs for another term and zero when she does not, and NoRecand (=1-Recand). Since a Wald test does not reject the equality of the estimated coefficients, our results do not confirm the hypothesis and empirical results obtained by Rosenberg (1992) for Israel nor the more conventional hypothesis that a "lame duck" has little incentive to produce a political business cycle.
Considering that some investments may take several months to be concluded, one should expect incumbents to start increasing investment expenditures in the year before elections, in order to signal greater competency to the electorate. We tested that hypothesis by adding to the model of the last column of that mayors increase expenditures in years of legislative elections to promote a better outcome for their parties at the national level. The results support this hypothesis.
Like Table 2, Table 3 shows little evidence of ideological effects in investment expenditures: the variable Right is only marginally statistically significant in the estimation of column 1 and is not significant in the other estimations.
The next step of the empirical analysis was to determine which types of investment expenditures show the greatest sensitivity to the electoral calendar.. The model of column 4 of Table 3 was estimated for the seven components of investment expenditures (see Table 4 ). There is evidence of opportunistic cycles for investments in (relative increases of 11.6% and 14.6%, respectively).
(Table 4, Page 20)
Given the strong evidence of the existence of political business cycles in the components of Other Buildings and of Miscellaneous Constructions, 29 we decided to analyze their sub-components. In order to economize on space, only the results for the sub-components for which there is evidence of opportunistic cycles are presented in Table 5 . 30 Concerning Other Buildings, that only happens for the sub-component Other (which has a weight of 53%), for which expenditures increase in the election year and, slightly less in the year before (increases of 21.6% and 17.6% relative to the sample mean The opportunistic behavior seems to lead not only to an increase in expenditures in general, but also to money transfers from investment components less visible by the electorate to those with greater visibility. 29 These are the two most important components of investment expenditures, as they jointly account for about 83% of the total (Other Investments = 17.3% and Miscellaneous Constructions = 65.6%). 30 The results for the other sub-components are available upon request.
Rural roads, and Other, with increases, relative to the mean, of 14.8%, 16.4% and 36.8%, respectively. It is worth noting that these three items account for around 69% of the expenditures in miscellaneous constructions. For the first and last of these subcomponents, expenditures also increase in the year prior to the election year, although by a smaller amount (relative increases of 10.6% and 27.4%, respectively). There is no evidence of ideological effects for the sub-components of investment expenditures included in Table 5 , as the dummy variable Right is never statistically significant.
( Table 5 , Page 21)
Conclusions
Empirical results provide clear evidence of political business cycles in Portuguese municipalities. The finding of such cycles at the local level provides support for models of rational opportunistic cycles like that of Rogoff and Sibert (1988 and Other). This suggests the intention to signal greater competence in pre-election periods. 31 The magnitude of the cycle does not seem to depend on the support the mayor enjoys in the municipal assembly, nor on the decision to run for another term in office, but left-wing oriented incumbents tend to be more opportunistic than right-wing ones.
As for ideological cycles, it is hard to identify general tendencies, given the inconsistency of the results for budget balances, total expenditures and capital expenditures. For investment expenditure and for most of its components, there is no evidence of partisan effects. 31 In future research we wish to analyze whether these increases in deficits and expenditures before elections influence election results. Studies performed at the aggregate level, Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 2004b) , allow us to conclude that both unemployment and inflation affect the vote intentions of the Portuguese and the popularity of the main political entities.
Politically-induced fluctuations in expenditures lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, which are harmful to the national economy. If such cycles could be prevented by way of new or tougher rules on the management of municipal finances, expressed in limits to deficits and accumulation of debt, the result should be an improvement in overall welfare. Notes: -Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; -two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; -The "Sargan test" is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; -The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Notes: -Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; -The coefficients and t-statistics for the five control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, PopDens, Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to economize space; -two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; -The "Sargan test" is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; -The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Notes: -Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in first-differences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; -The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, PopDens, Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to economize space; -two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; -The "Sargan test" is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; -The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Notes: -Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations in firstdifferences with the equation in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 10.2; -The coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables %Pop<15, %Pop>65, PopDens, Coastline and PopCat (included in all estimations) are not shown in order to economize space; -two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; -T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, e *, 10%; -The "Sargan test" is the test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions; -The hypothesis of second order autocorrelation of the residuals was always rejected and Sargan tests never rejected the validity of the over-identifying restrictions.
